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Anxiety strongly influences a person’s experience by affecting, among others, cognition 
and learning. Theoretical models of anxiety indicate that the level of anxiety experienced 
by an individual affects how they analyze threat-related incoming information. The 
purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between anxiety and the 
difference in the time it takes to make simple decisions about repeatedly presented 
photographs. The study included 71 participants who completed a task based on the 
repetition priming effect.  The photographs used for this task depicted human faces 
displaying a happy or fearful expression. The participants were presented twice with each 
photograph and were asked to indicate the gender of the face presented in the photograph.  
The outcome measure was the time that it took for each participant to react to the 
presented photographs.  
The findings indicate that anxiety, worry, and intolerance of uncertainty affect the 
perception of visual stimuli, such that people with higher anxiety, worry, or intolerance of 
uncertainty react differently to such stimuli. People with a history of a DSM-IV anxiety 
 
disorder diagnosis reacted faster to visual stimuli relative to healthy controls. The 
differences in information processing between people with high and low anxiety seem to 
provide support for cognitive theories that explain anxiety as the result of lack of 
habituation due to excessive avoidance and those that explain anxiety as the result of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Anxiety is the main and ever-present symptom in anxiety disorders, as classified 
and described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), which affect about 19 million adults in the United States 
every year (Grisel, Rasmussen, & Sperry, 2006). Feelings of anxiety may often be 
accompanied by unrelenting feelings of worry, apprehension, nervousness, fear, panic, 
obsessive thoughts, unwanted intrusive memories, nightmares, or repetitive ritualized 
behaviors. These feelings, thoughts, and behaviors are often characterized by 
dysregulation in muscle-tension or in sleep, respiratory, cardiovascular, or 
gastrointestinal systems.  
Anxiety and fear are both important common elements found in all anxiety 
disorders. Anxiety has been described as an emotional state that is future-oriented, while 
fear has been described as an alarm reaction that is focused and inflexible (Antony, 
Orsillo, & Roemer, 2001). Intense anxiety and fear are often accompanied by additional 
negative affect, a sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability, avoidance of feared 
situations/experiences, reliance on safety behaviors in order to reduce perceived threat, 
difficulty concentrating, and worry (Antony, Federici, & Stein, 2009; Antony, et al., 
2001). 
Worry 
Worry was first defined as an uncontrollable chain of thoughts charged with 
negative affect (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). This chain of thoughts 
aims to solve problems with uncertain outcomes, especially when some of these 
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outcomes may be negative. Hence, worry is closely related to the fear process (Borkovec 
et al., 1983). Worry has also been defined as an anticipatory cognitive process that is 
characterized by the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening, the tendency 
to predict negative outcomes for uncertain events, and the tendency to overestimate risk 
(Ladouseur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). Worry has further been defined as fear-producing 
thoughts and images related to everyday-life experiences that have the potential to result 
in adverse consequences (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Taylor, Thordarson, Sochting, 
2002). These thoughts and images are thought to be uncontrollable, excessive, repetitive, 
and to remain unresolved in the absence of intervention (Mathews, & Funke, 2006).  
According to cognitive theories of anxiety, worry is related to threat schemata in 
an individual’s long-term memory (Mathews, & Funke, 2006). When these threat 
schemata are activated, they may increase vigilance for internal or external threats (e.g. 
negative evaluation or harm, respectively). Increased vigilance for threat and increased 
detection of potentially threatening stimuli is the antecedent of worry. The preferential 
processing of threatening stimuli, also known as biased information processing, can have 
causal effects on the etiology and maintenance of anxiety and worry (Koster, Fox, & 
MacLeod, 2009). Information processing biases in worriers are evidenced by the 
increased need for time and evidence to make decisions related to ambiguous stimuli 
(Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 1991).  
Worry is often investigated in people diagnosed with General Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD) and by comparing people with GAD and pathological worry to low-worry non-
anxious controls (Holaway, Rodebaugh, & Heimberg, 2006). Some studies indicate that 
worry is a characteristic of normal levels of anxiety and is not limited to people that meet 
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criteria for Anxiety Disorders. A study by Ruscio (2002) revealed that only a modest 
percentage of high worriers (20%) met diagnostic criteria for GAD. Hence, worry is a 
construct that defines the experience of anxiety and is not necessarily restricted to a 
specific GAD diagnoses. In this study, rather than a specific symptom of GAD, worry is 
conceptualized as a dimensional characteristic that is present in people who experience 
high levels of anxiety (Naliboff & Rhudy, 2009; Wells & Mathews, 2006; Starcevic & 
Berle, 2006; Gladstone, Parker, Mitchell, Malhi, Wilhelm, & Austin, 2005). The 
variables that have been identified as predictors of excessive worry are: intolerance of 
uncertainty, beliefs that worry has a protective function, negative orientation towards 
problem situations, and cognitive avoidance (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 
1998). The relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and worry remains strong 
even after taking into account anxiety and depression (Buhr, & Dugas, 2006).  
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) has been defined as biased perception, 
interpretation, or negative emotional/cognitive/behavioral response to uncertain situations 
and events (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Dugas, Hedayati, Karavidas, Buhr, Francis, & Philips, 
2005; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). People with high IU perceive uncertain events 
as stressful and upsetting. They further interpret such events as negative, threatening, and 
unfair, and they avoid or are unable to act in uncertain situations. People with high IU are 
unable to tolerate the possibility of a negative outcome, even if the probability of such 
outcome is very small (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Dugas et al., 2005). IU has been 
conceptualized as a dispositional characteristic, a personality trait, a cognitive process, 
and a cognitive filter (Dugas and Robichaud, 2007; Dugas et al., 2005; Fisher & Wells, 
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2009). It has been suggested that IU results in selective encoding and interpretation of 
information, such that people with high IU pay more attention to uncertain stimuli, go 
through greater elaborative encoding of uncertain information, have enhanced 
recollection of uncertain stimuli, and have greater tendency to interpret such stimuli as 
threatening (Dugas et al., 2005). Researchers suggest that preferential encoding of 
threatening information, threatening interpretation of uncertain stimuli, and preferential 
retrieval of threatening information results in extreme concern and worry when any 
physical or psychological peril is present (Koerner, 2008). Research investigating the 
influence of anxiety and of IU on information processing has indicated that IU is a unique 
contributor that defines the experience of anxiety beyond anxiety symptoms. IU has been 
conceptualized both as a cognitive vulnerability and as a characteristic of anxiety; it is 
part of a vicious circle where its presence influences worry which in turn interferes with 
information processing of uncertain stimuli, which then maintains and enhances anxiety 
symptoms (Koerner and Dugas, 2008).  
Information Processing Bias 
One of the factors deemed critical in the development and maintenance of 
intolerance of uncertainty, worry, and ultimately anxiety is biased information-processing 
(Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). Biased information processing is at the center of many 
theoretical models of anxiety and anxiety disorders (Rapee, 2001; Mogg, & Bradley, 
1998; Mathews, & Mackintosh, 1998; Eysenck, 1992; Beck, & Clark, 1997; Clark, & 
Wells, 1995; Woody, & Rachman, 1994; Ohman, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988; Foa & Kozak, 1986). Biased information processing in people with 
anxiety, rather than narrow, deficient, incorrect, or distorted, means selective information 
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processing that is negatively biased, resulting in higher-than-normal vigilance for 
threatening and other adverse stimuli.  
Information processing biases occur in all people, and these biases are driven by a 
person’s experiences and cognitions regarding the world and the self. In addition to the 
influence of normative human experiences on information processing, a great deal of 
attention has been focused on the influence of emotional and cognitive difficulties on this 
process. Research indicates that in anxious people information processing biases tends to 
reconfirm their view of the world as a dangerous place (Ouimet, Gawrinski, & Dozois, 
2009). People suffering from depression tend to have longer reaction times due to motor 
and cognitive slowing, fail to respond to target stimuli, or focus on negative aspects of 
stimuli more often than non-depressed people Christensen, Carney, & Segal, 2006). 
People with ADHD tend to have slower processing speed and decreased accuracy in 
complicated tasks both as children and adults (Semrud-Clikeman, & Ellison, 2009; 
Mapou, 2009). Thus, when investigating information processing biases in anxiety, it is 
important to take into account several sources of bias that are likely present in the 
population of interest. 
Information processing biases have been investigated during different stages of 
information processing—specifically during transformation of stimuli into subjective 
cognitive representations of these stimuli (encoding) (Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2002; 
MacLeod, 1991), during the process of assigning meaning and placing stimuli in a 
constellation of similar and related cognitive structures (interpretation) (Wilson, 
MacLeod, & Campbell, 2007; Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2002), and during recollection of 
subjective representations of stimuli that had been stored in memory (retrieval) (Mitte, 
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2008; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn, 2007). 
While most researchers agree, in part, that anxiety is characterized by information 
processing biases (McNally & Reese, 2009); they disagree on the pattern and timeline in 
which such biases occur.  
Theoretical Models of Information Processing Biases in Anxiety  
Early cognitive theories of the etiology of anxiety proposed that anxiety is the 
result of enhanced automatic encoding of threatening stimuli, enhanced automatic 
retrieval of the same, enhanced automatic proliferation of anxiety schemata (Beck, 1976), 
and interpretation of uncertain stimuli as threatening (Bower, 1983). Although these 
theories propose different timelines and mechanisms of the automatic cognitive processes 
that enhance and maintain anxiety, they both predict facilitated processing of threatening 
stimuli. 
Some later theories proposed that the attention of anxious individuals is 
immediately captured by threatening stimuli and attentional resources are 
disproportionately allocated to processing these stimuli during the initial, automatic 
stages of processing (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Ohman, 1999). 
Other theories proposed that cognitive resources are disproportionately allocated towards 
threatening stimuli during later, elaborative, and interpretative processes (Mathews, & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997).  
Certain theoretical models propose biased or selective processing in both initial 
automatic and later conscious stages of information processing. These models include 
preferential processing of threatening stimuli during initial, automatic stages of 
information processing (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; 
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Mogg et al, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). The preferential 
automatic processing is followed by sustained selective semantic elaboration of 
threatening stimuli (Beck & Clark, 1997), threatening interpretation of uncertain stimuli 
(Eysenck, 1992), or avoidance resulting in failure to assess threat accurately and failure 
to habituate to threatening stimuli (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Amir, 
Foa, & Coles, 1998; Mogg et al, 1997). 
Experimental Studies of Information Processing Bias in Anxiety, Worry, and Intolerance 
of Uncertainty 
Research on information processing biases has provided support for the existence 
of such biases in people with specific anxiety disorders (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Clark & 
McManus, 2002; Heinrichs & Hofman, 2001; Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; Musa 
& Lepine, 2000; McNally, 1999; Summerfeldt & Endler, 1998). A systematic 
quantitative review of this research provided evidence that threat-related bias is a robust 
phenomenon, which differentiates non-anxious individuals from those with different 
types of anxiety across a variety of experimental conditions (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  
Research on information processing biases and worry or intolerance of 
uncertainty has provided support for biased recall for stimuli denoting uncertainty (Dugas 
et al., 2005), threatening interpretation of ambiguous statements (Dugas et al., 2005), 
indecisiveness and hypersensitivity regarding threat (Rassin & Muris, 2005), and concern 
and threatening appraisal regarding ambiguous situations (Keorner & Dugas, 2008). 
Studies investigating processing biases in worry and intolerance of uncertainty have used 
verbal-linguistic stimuli and have assessed biases during the interpretative and 
elaborative phase of information processing. Dugas et al. (2005) reasoned that words are 
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the ideal medium for investigating biases in information processing in worriers and 
people with high intolerance of uncertainty, because verbal-linguistic processes 
predominate in worry.  
Paradigms Used in the Study of Information Processing Biases 
Experimental paradigms used to investigate information processing differ in how 
presence of anxiety affects task completion and in how information processing biases are 
operationalized. The presence of anxiety can either facilitate or disrupt performance on a 
task. Most paradigms entail tasks performed in the presence and/or absence of 
threatening stimuli. In some paradigms the presence of threatening stimuli disrupts or 
interferes with task completion. In other paradigms the presence of threatening stimuli 
increases ease of completing the task in the presence of anxiety. The combined results of 
these types of experiments provide strong support for the presence of information 
processing biases in anxiety disorders.   
The paradigms that have been used to investigate processing biases towards 
threatening stimuli are the emotional Stroop, dot-probe, emotional spatial cuing, and 
visual search (for an in-depth review of these paradigms and studies, cf. Bar-Heim et al, 
2006). Information processing biases in these paradigms are operationalized as the 
difference in the time it takes an individual to react to threatening stimuli versus time to 
react to neutral or positive stimuli. Experiments using these paradigms allow for reaching  
conclusions with regards to information processing biases in general and specifically with 
regards to disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources in verbal-linguistic 
processing of threatening stimuli (emotional Stroop), engaged attention or inability to 
disengage attention with threatening stimuli (dot-probe task), engaged attention with 
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threatening stimuli (spatial cuing), and enhanced attentional capture of threatening 
stimuli (emotional visual search). These experiments do not allow for making 
conclusions with regards to the disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources during 
the non-verbal processing of threatening stimuli.   
The bias toward prioritizing threat encoding is present at the earliest stages of 
attentional processes, as the individuals rapidly orient to and detect the crucial 
characteristics of a stimulus (Surcinelli et al, 2006; Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 
1998). The repetition priming task that will be used in this study aims to investigate 
disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources following attention capture and 
preceding verbal processing of threatening stimuli or disengagement from stimuli.  
Repetition Priming 
Repetition priming is the increased ease of processing a stimulus following a 
single previous presentation (Schacter, 1987). The repetition priming effect can be 
assessed by comparing the participants’ reaction during the first time they are presented 
with a stimulus against their reaction during the second presentation of the same stimulus. 
The differences between initial and following presentations are observable in behavioral 
and biological reactions, such as reduced reaction time (Thomas & LaBar, 2005), 
increased probability of producing the primed stimulus (Zhou, Hu, Sun, & Huang, 2006), 
reduced brain activation evident in fMRI (Orfanidou, Marslen-Wilson, & Davis, 2006) 
and EEG data (Wiese, Schweinberger, Neuman, 2008).   
Repetition priming tasks are thus characterized by consecutive presentations of 
stimuli. The first presentation of the stimulus is often indicated as the first or prime 
phase. In the second presentation or the test phase, the previously presented stimuli are 
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intermixed with new stimuli. The participants are usually asked to react to or to make 
cognitive or perceptual judgments that do not require recollection of previous encounters 
with the stimuli, such as categorize words as concrete vs. abstract, or categorize 
photographs of faces as male vs. female (Thomas & LaBar, 2005; Schwartz, Shook, 
Vaidya, & Deutsch, 2009). Often participants make cognitive or perceptual judgments 
regarding previously presented stimuli during the test phase of the tasks faster or more 
accurately than during the priming phase faster and more accurately than judgments 
regarding novel stimuli.  
Researchers initially explored repetition priming through the use of cognitive 
tasks involving lexical decisions (Forbach, Stanners, & Hochhaus, 1974), word 
identification (Neisser, 1954), or word stem/fragment completion (Tulving, Schacter, & 
Stark, 1982). The study of repetition priming further evolved to include drawings (Cave, 
Bost, & Cobb, 1992) and photographs of objects and faces (Bruce, Burton, Carson, & 
Mason, 1994; Mitchell & Brown, 1988; Warren, & Morton, 1982; Uttl, Graf, & 
Santacruz, 2006).  Repetition priming paradigms have been used with both normal and 
clinical samples (Danion, Williard-Schroeder, Zimmerman, Grange, Schlienger, & 
Singer, 1991; Enright & Beech, 1993; Thomas, & LaBar, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2009).   
Repetition Priming Stimuli: Emotional Faces  
The presentation of a human face is a powerful stimulus that initiates immediate 
cognitive processing (Wiese, Schweinberger, & Neuman, 2008). Within fractions of a 
second we perceive enough information from a presented face to make judgments 
concerning someone’s gender, race and age (Bruce & Young, 1998). One of the vital 
characteristics of a face is the emotion expressed in that face (Wiese, Schweinberger, 
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Neuman, 2008). Emotionality is a characteristic that often results in a lasting and salient 
memory of that stimulus (Parrot & Spackman, 2000). Emotional expressions are one of 
the factors that have been investigated in the framework of repetition priming, in the 
attempt to better understand the impact of emotions on perception (Bentley, Vuilleumier, 
Thiel, Driver, & Dolan, 2003; Burton, Rabin, Wyatt, Frohlich, Vardy, & Dimitri, 2005; 
Campanella, Quinet, Bruyer, Crommelinck,  & Guerit, 2002). Research to date indicates 
that the introduction of an emotional dimension leads to changes in the repetition priming 
effect; however, the findings are mixed and difficult to integrate (Burton et al., 2005; 
Bentley et al., 2003). The present study investigated the repetition priming effect for 
photographs of faces displaying happy or fearful expressions. The advantage of using 
photographs of emotional faces is that it requires minimal verbal-linguistic processing; it 
thus focuses the search for processing biases in the time window following the attention 
capture and preceding the verbal processing of threatening stimuli or disengagement from 
stimuli—a time-window that has not been investigated through the paradigms used in the 
studies to date (Bar-Heim et al., 2007).  
Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the differences in the repetition 
priming effect of emotional stimuli in individuals differing in their anxiety level. Several 
studies have investigated the existence of the repetition priming effect for emotional 
stimuli (Lamy, Amunts, & Bar-Haim, 2008; Goetz; Goetz, & Robinson, 2007; 
Marchewka & Nowicka, 2007). The usual repetition priming paradigm involves 
presentation of initial stimuli followed presentation of initial stimuli intermixed with 
novel stimuli. The difference between the time it takes to react to old and novel stimuli 
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during the second presentation is calculated in order to establish the magnitude of the 
repetition priming effect. Similar to previous work, this study investigated how the 
emotional valence of the stimuli affects the repetition priming effect.  Unlike prior work, 
this study investigated the differences in repetition priming effect in relation to anxiety 
levels.  
The participants were instructed to react to the stimuli, namely photographs of 
faces displaying happy or fearful emotions. They were guided to process a neutral 
characteristic of the photograph, the gender of the face in the photograph, and not the 
characteristic that may carry threatening information, the emotion displayed by the face. 
This paradigm (Schwartz, Shook, Vaidya, & Deutsch, 2009) aimed to investigate 
differences in information processing following the attention capture and preceding the 
verbal processing of threatening stimuli or disengagement from stimuli.  The full 
literature review appears in Appendix A. 
Primary Aim and Hypothesis 
Aim 
The primary aim of the this study was to investigate the relationship between 
severity of anxiety and the repetition priming effect for pictures of unfamiliar fearful 
faces. 
Hypothesis  
It was hypothesized that severity of anxiety would have an effect on the repetition 
priming effect for fearful faces, such that participants with higher anxiety scores would 
display longer latencies in making judgments of the gender of these faces. 
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Secondary Aims and Hypotheses 
Aim 1 
One secondary aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
severity of Intolerance of Uncertainty and the repetition priming effect for pictures of 
unfamiliar fearful faces. 
Hypothesis 1 
It was hypothesized that the severity of Intolerance of Uncertainty would have an 
effect on the repetition priming effect for fearful faces, such that participants with higher 
intolerance of uncertainty scores would display longer latencies in making judgments of 
the gender of these faces. 
Aim 2 
Another secondary aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
severity of tendency to worry and the repetition priming effect for pictures of unfamiliar 
fearful faces. 
Hypothesis 2 
It was hypothesized that the severity of the tendency to worry would have an 
effect on the repetition priming effect for fearful faces, such that participants with higher 
worry scores would display longer latencies in making judgments of the gender of these 
faces. 
Exploratory Aims 
Exploratory Aim 1 
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An exploratory aim of this study was to investigate the differences in information 
processing biases in people with and without anxiety disorders as evidenced by longer 
latencies in making judgments of the gender of fearful faces. 
Exploratory Aim 2 
An exploratory aim of this study was to investigate the unique contributions of 
trait anxiety, worry, and intolerance of uncertainty to information processing biases as 




Chapter 2: Method 
The Institutional Review Board of the University of Maryland, College Park 
approved of the study procedures. I included the IRB approval memo in Appendix A.   
Participants 
I recruited participants through the Department of Psychology mass screening of 
the students registered to take the class Introduction to Psychology and through 
presentations in lower level psychology courses. The students were directed to the Sona 
system (http://psychology.umd.edu/research/sona.html), where they were able to sign up 
for the study. On the Sona system webpage the students were informed that the study 
aimed to investigate changes in the repetition priming effect; no information about the 
relationship of repetition priming to anxiety was included on the introductory 
information. The inclusion criteria for this study were that each participant be at least 18 
years of age and a student at the University of Maryland, College Park. The exclusion 
criteria were a diagnosis of any psychotic disorders at any point during the participant’s 
lifetime and current use of anti-anxiety medication. The participants that met the 
exclusion criteria completed the task and received credit for their participation; their data 
were not included in the analysis. Ninety-three participants signed up for the study and 
were randomly assigned to the order in which I exposed them to two kinds of 
photographs (i.e., happy or fearful).   
Design Overview 
I calculated power analyses for the primary aim of the study according to Cohen’s 
set correlation approach (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Studies investigating 
threat-related information processing biases in people with anxiety have yielded effect 
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sizes in the medium range (d = .45; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Previous studies investigating 
specifically the relationship between the repetition priming effect and anxiety are scarce 
and do not provide the information necessary to determine the effect sizes (Enright & 
Beech, 1993; Thompson, 1981). Assuming a medium size effect of f
2
 =.1511 for the 
relationship between anxiety and emotionality of stimuli and a sample size of 82, power 
(1 – β) was estimated at 0.80.  
Design Considerations  
The primary focus of this study was to investigate information processing biases 
as measured by changes in the response time in people with varied levels of anxiety. 
Anxiety is associated with higher levels of experienced anxiety and atypical processing of 
threatening stimuli (Cooper, Rowe, & Penton-Voak, 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). The 
participants’ level of experienced anxiety was measured through self-report measures of 
anxiety and of constructs deemed crucial to the experience and etiology of anxiety, such 
as worry and intolerance of uncertainty. In addition, a current or lifetime diagnosis of an 
anxiety disorder was established through a clinical interview, in order to consider the role 
of such diagnosis on the reaction times to emotional stimuli.  
Information processing biases become evident as anxious individuals interact with 
stimuli that reconfirm their expectations of ever-present danger (Ouimet, Gawrinski, & 
Dozois, 2009).  Thus, the next consideration was with regard to the emotional expression 
displayed by the faces in the photographs that were presented to the participants.  
It was necessary to address factors that may affect reaction time in order to 
differentiate and control for differences due to demographic or stimulus characteristics, 
rather than to a person’s level of experienced anxiety and the emotion displayed in the 
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photographs (emotion). One consideration was the order in which the blocks of 
photographs were presented (block) – fearful photographs or happy photographs first. 
Another consideration was the gender of the face in the photograph (face gender) – male 
or female, and the position from the start of the task in which the block of photographs 
was presented (position). Consideration was also given to demographic characteristics, 
such as participant gender, race or ethnic identification, education, and age. 
Reaction time, or the time it took for the participants to indicate as quickly as 
possible the gender of the face presented in a photograph, was the main outcome 
measure. Reaction time was first measured during the priming phase of the Repetition 
Priming Task and then it was measured again during the second presentation of the 
photographs. Due to the repetition priming effect, reaction times at priming phase were 
expected to be longer than at test phase (Schacter, 1987).  
Assessments and Materials  
The research study was conducted in the Laboratory of Human Psychophysiology 
at the University of Maryland, College Park, which includes a private space with a desk 
and computer. 
Demographic Questionnaire  
The demographic questionnaire was administered to obtain data on the 
participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, and education. (Appendix A). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)  
STAI is a self-report assessment instrument intended to differentiate between 
temporary feelings of anxiety and anxiety as a long-term personality trait in adults. STAI 
also measures severity of anxiety level (Tilton, 2008). This instrument was chosen 
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because it quantifies the level of anxiety, making it possible to test the secondary 
hypothesis of this study, which states that higher levels of anxiety will be associated with 
longer reaction times during the test phase of the repetition priming task. More 
importantly, STAI has sound psychometric properties. The Trait Subscale of the STAI 
has shown good stability in studies spanning 14 – 20 days, with test-retest correlations of 
.86 (Rule, & Traver, 1883; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 1970). The STAI has been 
found to be reliable in large independent samples of college students, working adults, and 
military recruits, with alpha coefficients between .86 and .95 (Antony, Orsillo, & 
Roemer, 2001) with a median of .90 (Spielberger, Reheiser, Owen, & Sydeman, 2004). 
The STAI has two subscales that measure State and Trait characteristics.  The scale has a 
four-factor structure that includes items regarding anxiety and mood, in both state and 
trait subscales (Vigneau & Cormier, 2008; McWillliams & Cox, 200; Bieling, Antony, & 
Swinson, 1998). Concurrent validity of the STAI has been demonstrated through 
significant correlations with other anxiety measures ranging from .73 to .85, and 
Cronbach’s  coefficients for college students in the normative sample for trait anxiety 
ranged from .90 to .91 (Spielberger, 1983). In this study the reliability for the STAI was 
calculated separately for each subscale (Trait, State) and also for the Anxiety factor in 
each subscale. Cronbach’s  coefficient for the STAI-Trait was .76, and the  coefficient 
for the anxiety items in the STAI-Trait was .869. Cronbach’s  coefficient for the STAI-
State was .71, and the  coefficient for the anxiety items in the STAI-State was .817.  
Structured Clinical Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders Axis I Disorders (SCID)  
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The SCID is a semi-structured interview based on the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria 
and is the most widely used assessment instrument in the United States (First & Gibbon, 
2004). The SCID is organized in modules that cover psychological disorders in 
accordance with DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. This instrument was chosen because it is a 
widely used diagnostic instrument with good psychometric properties and it has been 
suggested as a good candidate for assigning diagnostic status in research studies (Antony, 
& Rowa, 2005). The SCID will be used to test the primary hypothesis of this study, 
which states that participants with an anxiety disorder will show impairment in implicit 
memory. The reliability of the SCID has been investigated using joint or videotaped 
interviews and has produced kappas ranging from 0.70 to 1.00 (Spitzer, Williams, 
Gibbon, & First, 1996). The validity of the SCID has been more challenging to measure; 
however, studies to date comparing it to standard clinical interviews reveal good validity, 
with kappa coefficients ranging from .57 to .76.    
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS)  
IUS is a self-report assessment instrument intended to measure the emotional and 
behavioral consequences of feelings of uncertainty, how feelings of uncertainty reflect on 
one’s character, the expectation of a predictable future, frustration with unpredictability, 
efforts to control the future, and inflexible answers in response to uncertainty (Freeston, 
Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). This instrument was chosen because it 
quantifies intolerance of uncertainty, which is one of the factors that influence the 
experience of anxiety via cognitive biases (Dugas et al, 2005).  Reliability studies have 
demonstrated that IUS has excellent internal consistency with α = .95, and good 5-week 
test-retest reliability with r = .74 (Buhr & Dugas, 2000). The IUS has shown good 
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validity when used alongside measures of worry, r’s = .53 and .63, and trait anxiety, r = 
.57 (Freeston et al., 1994; Buhr & Dugas, 2000). In addition to the high correlation 
between measures of IU and anxiety or worry, IU has shown to be a unique contributor to 
the experience of anxiety beyond anxiety symptoms (Koerner & Dugas, 2008). The IUS 
in this study showed very good reliability with Cronbach’s  coefficient .917.  
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ)  
PSWQ is a self-report questionnaire intended to measure the intensity of a 
tendency to excessive pathological worry, without reference to the content of worries 
(Robichaud et al, 2003; Roemer, 2001). This instrument was chosen because it quantifies 
an important factor that is related to the experience of anxiety as well as information 
processing biases (Mathews & Funke, 2006). The PSWQ has demonstrated good 2 to 10-
week test-retest reliability in college samples with r’s ranging from .74 to .93, and very 
good internal consistency with α ranging from .86 to .93. The PSWQ has shown good 
validity when used alongside measures of worry, r’s = .59 and .67, and anxiety, r’s = .40 
to .74 (Davey, 1993; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ in this 
study showed very good reliability with Cronbach’s  coefficient .904.  
The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAM-D)  
HAM-D is a rating scale that is intended to measure the severity of depression. 
This instrument was chosen in order to gather information about the participants’ 
symptoms of depression, which may affect information processing biases (Hamilton, 
1960). In a meta-analytic study including 35 reliability estimates from 23 studies, the 
HAM-D demonstrated good reliability with a mean α of .79 (Lopez-Pina, Sanchez-Meca, 
& Rosa-Alcazar, 2009). The HAM-D has shown good validity when used alongside 
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measures of depression, with most r’s measuring over the adequate level of .50 (Bagby, 
Ryder, Schuller, & Marshall, 2004). Two participants scored above the cutoff for mild 
depression, thus it was not possible to investigate the influence of depression scores on 
information processing biases. 
The Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS)  
ASRS is a self-report questionnaire intended to assess the presence of symptoms 
of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). This instrument was chosen in 
order to control for possible interferences of ADHD symptoms with information 
processing biases that might affect the primary aim of this study. Ten participants 
indicated experiencing symptoms highly consistent with ADHD. The ASRS has 
demonstrated good reliability with Cronbach’s  coefficients .84 to .89 (Adler, Spencer, 
Faraone, Kessler, Howes, Biederman, & Secnik, 2006). The ASRS has shown good 
concordance when used alongside clinician diagnoses with an area under the receiver 
operating characteristic curve of .90 (Kessler, Adler, Gruber, Sarawate, Spencer, & Van 
Brunt, 2007). 
Pictures of Faces  
The picture stimuli consist of photographs of 60 unique faces, each shown both 
with a happy and fearful expression, for a total of 120 faces. The faces are balanced 
across gender (15 pictures in combinations of female/fearful, female/happy, male/fearful, 
and male/happy). The picture stimuli consist of photographs of 60 unique faces, each 
shown both with a happy and fearful expression, for a total of 120 faces. The faces are 
balanced across gender (15 pictures in combinations of female/fearful, female/happy, 
male/fearful, and male/happy). The photographs are part of the NimStim and Gur/Kohler 
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databases of photographs of faces displaying a variety of emotions, with fear and 
happiness as two of the possible emotions (Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, McCarry, Nurse, 
Hare, Marcus, Westerlund, Casey,  Nelson, 2010; Gur, Sara, Hagendoorn, Marom, 
Hughett, Macy, Turner, Bajcsy, Posner, Gur, 2002). These databases have been validated 
and have displayed an accuracy of identification rate between .79 and .80, which is 
acceptable for samples of photographs that include models of multi-racial/ethnic 
background (Gur, Schroeder, Turner, McGrath, Chan, Turetsky, Alsop, Maldjian, & Gur, 
2002; Tottenham et al, 2009). The pictures were programmed and presented using E-
Prime (E-Prime, 2001), which is software used to design experiments and collect data. 
A pilot study was conducted in order to investigate the perceived difference in the 
emotional display in the photographs in our sample. Each picture was rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale, where 1 corresponded to “to a great extent” and 4 corresponded to “not at 
all.” The averages of ratings are presented in Table 1. Separate t tests were conducted in 
order to compare the ratings of the happy and fearful photographs. The happy 
photographs were rated as significantly happier than the fearful photographs [t (10) = 
9.78, p < .001] and the fearful photographs were rated as more fearful than the happy 
photographs [t (10) = 10.92, p < .001]. Also, the happy photographs were rated as 
significantly happier than fearful [t (10) = 8.6, p < .001] and the fearful photographs were 
rated as significantly more fearful than happy [t (10) = 13.86, p < .001]. 
Table 1. Ratings of Photographs of Faces Displaying Happy and Fearful Expression 
 Happy Photographs Fearful Photographs 
Happy Rating  M = 1.57, SD = .49 M = 3.7, SD = .21 
Fearful Rating M = 3.71, SD = .36
 





Prior to the laboratory procedures, the students were randomly assigned to one of 
the Order of Stimulus Emotion groups.  
Laboratory Session 
The procedure for this study lasted approximately 90 minutes, with the laboratory 
procedure lasting about 60 minutes and the following clinical interview lasting between 
20 and 40 minutes. The length of the laboratory procedure was stable and similar for all 
participants. The length of the clinical interview was dependant on the life experiences 
and pathology of a participant. The goal of the clinical interview was to diagnose 
psychological disorders rather than gather detailed information about the difficulties 
experienced by a participant, thus even interviews with participants that met criteria for 
several psychological disorders did not exceed 40 minutes. An overview of the 
procedures is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Laboratory Protocol 
Time Time Lapse  Procedure 
Pre-session  Prepare randomization schedule for Order of Stimulus 
emotion and Order of Procedure 
T – 34 10 Informed Consent 
T - 24 2 Demographic Questionnaire 
T – 22  10 STAI 
T – 12 4 IUS 
T – 8 4 PSWQ 
T – 4 3 Instructions for Repetition Priming Task 
t – 1 1 Repetition Priming Task Practice Trial 
T 0 10 Repetition Priming Task 
T + 10  5 Instructions for Recognition Task 
T + 15 5 Recognition Task 
T + 18 20-40 SCID-IV 
T + 108 5 Debriefing and Conclusion  
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Note: IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
SCID-IV = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory.  
 
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were provided with a written 
description of the study procedures and asked to complete a written consent form. The 
participants were informed verbally about the procedures involved in this study, the 
potential risks of this study, issues pertaining to confidentiality, and their rights as 
participants (e.g., that they have the right to withdrawal from the study at any point in 
time). 
Following the provision of informed consent, the participants were asked to 
complete a demographics questionnaire, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, and the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire. After these measures are completed, the participant was 
directed to the computer and asked to complete the computer task. After the participants 
completed the computer tasks, they were asked to complete the SCID. 
Repetition Priming Task 
The repetition priming task lasted no longer than 10 minutes. During this task, the 
participants were presented with photographs of faces displaying a happy or fearful 
expression (Schwartz et al, 2009). Each trial (presentation of a photograph) consisted of a 
1000 ms pre-target fixation stimulus and a 1000 millisecond of target presentation. An 
overview of each trial is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Repetition Priming Task Trials  
Presentation Time Duration 
Pre-target Fixation Stimulus 1000 milliseconds 
Photograph  1000 milliseconds 
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 The repetition priming task was preceded by 8 practice trials, containing 
photographs of an equal number of happy and fearful faces of an equal number of males 
and females. These practice faces were not included in the stimuli for the task itself. The 
picture stimuli for the repetition priming task consisted of a total of 120 presentations, 
using 60 photographs of 60 unique faces (15 pictures in combinations of female/fearful, 
female/happy, male/fearful, and male/happy). The photographs of the 60 unique faces (30 
happy faces, 30 fearful faces) were divided in 10 blocks of 6 photographs of like 
emotional valence (5 blocks of fearful faces, 5 blocks of happy faces). The pictures in the 
blocks were randomized with regards to gender, with each block containing an equal 
number of pictures of males and females. As the participants were presented with each 
photograph, they indicated the gender of the presented face by pressing two buttons. The 
participants were presented with each block of 6 photographs twice, once in the priming 
phase and once in the test phase. Each test phase block of 6 photographs immediately 
followed the priming phase containing the same six photographs. During the repetition 
priming task, each participant was presented with only one out of the two photographs of 
each of the 60 unique faces in the database, specifically with 60 photographs out of the 
120 photographs in the database. An overview of the Repetition Priming Task is 
presented in the following table (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Repetition Priming Task 






1 Priming Block 1 Fearful Happy 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Test Block 1 Fearful Happy 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
2 Priming Block 2 Happy Fearful 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 
Test Block 2 Happy Fearful 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 
3 Priming Block 3 Fearful Happy 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
Test Block 3 Fearful Happy 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
4 Priming Block 4 Happy Fearful 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 
Test Block 4 Happy Fearful 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 
5 Priming Block 5 Fearful Happy 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 
Test Block 5 Fearful Happy 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 
6 Priming Block 6 Happy Fearful 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 
Test Block 6 Happy Fearful 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 
7 Priming Block 7 Fearful Happy 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 
Test Block 7 Fearful Happy 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 
8 Priming Block 8 Happy Fearful 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 
Test Block 8 Happy Fearful 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 
9 Priming Block 9 Fearful Happy 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 
Test Block 9 Fearful Happy 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 
10 Priming Block 10 Happy Fearful 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 
Test Block 10 Happy Fearful 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 
 
This is a simplified example; the order of the photographs will be randomized at every 
administration. 
 
Task 2: Recognition Task 
Following the Repetition Priming Task, the participants were given verbal 
instructions for the Recognition Task. The materials for the Recognition Task included 
all the 120 photographs in the database, and the participants were presented 
simultaneously with both the happy and fearful version of each face in the same slide. 
The participants were instructed to indicate which photograph from each pair they had 
seen during the Repetition Priming Task. Each slide was preceded by a 500 millisecond 
fixation stimulus: a white plus sign. The order of the target slides was randomized and 
self-paced. The position of the target photograph in the slides was random and alternated 
with respect to laterality. The data from this Task were collected for future studies. 
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Debriefing and Conclusion 
Upon the completion of all tasks and assessment measures the participants were 
given information about the purpose of the study. They were informed that this study’s 
purpose was to investigate information processing biases in people differing in levels of 
anxiety. They were also briefly explained theoretical models of information processing 
biases and how the tasks completed by the participants relate to the purpose of the study. 
It was predicted that during or as a result of the assessment procedures, some participants 
may realize that they have questions they would like to discuss with a mental health 
professional. Preparations were made for all participants to be provided with referrals to 
mental health professionals, obtained from an established referral list already in use at the 
University of Maryland Psychology Clinic. 
 28 
Chapter 3: Results  
Preliminary Analysis.  
A set of preliminary analyses were conducted in order to determine if the reaction 
times in the sample for this study differed significantly on a variety of demographic 
characteristics and stimulus characteristics.  
Demographic and Stimulus Characteristics  
Ninety-three college students were recruited for the study and seventy-one were 
included in the final analysis; the data for two participants were lost due to technical 
difficulties, and the data for twenty participants were lost due to unforeseen equipment 
loss (stolen laptop storing database). The study sample included 31 (43.66%) males and 
40 (56.33%) females. The participants ranged in age from 18 to 25 (M = 19.69, SD = 
1.72). The study sample was diverse with regard to race and ethnicity: 35 (53.5%) 
participants identified as Caucasian/European American, 16 (22.5%) identified as 
African/African American, 8 (11.26%) identified as Asian/Asian America, 6 (8.45%) 
identified as Hispanic/Hispanic American, 1 (1.4%) identified as Native American, and 2 
(2.8%) identified as Other and did not specify their race or ethnicity. The study sample 
was diverse with regard to education: 20 (40.08%) of the participants were freshmen, 17 
(23.9%) were juniors, 13 (18.3%) were sophomores, and 12 (16.9%) were seniors.  
The participants completed HAM-D and ASRS in order to investigate a possible 
relationship between depression and ADHD on information processing biases. Two 
participants scored above the cutoff for mild depression; thus it was not possible to 
investigate the influence of depression scores on information processing biases. Ten 
participants indicated experiencing symptoms highly consistent with ADHD. There were 
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no significant differences in reaction times to photographs of happy and fearful faces 
between people that experience symptoms of ADHD and those who did not [t(69) = .01, 
p > .05]. 
A series of univariate tests was conducted in order to investigate differences in the 
scores on STAI-State, STAI-Trait, PSWQ, and IUS based on the demographic 
characteristics (Table 5). These analyses indicated significant differences in the scores of 
STAI-State, STAI-Trait, and PSWQ based on Gender and in the scores of STAI-Trait 
based on Education. Post-hoc Bonferroni’s tests showed that females had significantly 
higher STAI-State, STAI-Trait, and PSWQ scores than males. Post-hoc Bonferroni’s 
tests showed that sophomores had significantly higher STAI-Trait scores than juniors; all 
other comparisons were not significant.  
  
Table 5. Differences in STAI, PSWQ, and IUS Scores Based on Demographic 
Characteristics 
 STAI-State STAI-Trait PSWQ IUS 
Age F(6, 64) =.69, p >.05 F(6, 64) =1.66, p >.05 F(6, 64) =.79, p >.05 F(6, 64) =1.31, p >.05 
Gender F(1, 69) =12.11, p<.05*
 
F(1, 69) =5.39, p <.05* F(1, 69) =7.21, p <.05* F(1, 69) =1.05, p >.05 
Ethnicity F(5, 65) =.76, p >.05
 
F(5, 65) =.53, p >.05
 
F(5, 65) =.48, p >.05 F(5, 65) =.82, p >.05 
Education F(3, 67) =2.53, p >.05
 
F(3, 67) =3.35, p <.05*
 
F(3, 67) =1.81, p >.05
 
F(3, 67) =1.16, p >.05 
A Linear Mixed Model analysis was conducted in order to investigate the effect 
of demographic and stimulus characteristics on response time (RT). The results did not 
yield any significant effects with regard to gender (F (1, 8483) = 3.731, p = .053), age 
[F(1, 8482) = 3.094, p = .079], and ethnicity [F(1, 8479) = 3.108, p = .07].  The results 
yielded a significant effect with regards to education [F(1, 8473) = 41.16, p = .00; Table 
7]. Post-hoc Bonferroni’s tests indicated that freshmen reacted significantly slower than 
sophomores, junior, and seniors; sophomores reacted significantly slower than seniors 
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and faster than freshman and juniors; juniors reacted significantly slower than 
sophomores and seniors and faster than freshman; and seniors reacted faster than 
freshman, sophomores, and juniors (Table 6). 
Table 6. Education Means and SD’s (in Milliseconds) 
Education Mean SD 
Freshmen 580.333 4.574 
Sophomore 543.128 4.998 
Junior 562.991 5.222 
Senior 517.701 3.828 
 
The results did not yield any significant effects with regard to the following 
characteristics of the photographs or their presentation: emotion [F(1, 8473) = .678, p = 
.410], block [F(1, 8532) = .247, p = .619], face gender [F(1, 8479) = 2.98, p = .086], and 
position [F(1, 8532) = .218, p = .641].  
The results yielded a significant effect with regard to order of presentation of the 
happy and fearful faces, such that participants that were presented with the photographs 
of fearful pictures first (F) reacted faster than those presented with the photographs of 
happy faces first (H) [F(1, 8475) = 15.32, p = .00; M(F)  = 556.941, SD (F) = 4.994; 
M(H) = 561.661, SD(H) = 4.724, Table 7].  
Table 7. Demographic and Stimulus Characteristics with Significant Effects on 
Reaction Time 
 Education Order 
Reaction Time F(1, 8473) = 41.16, p = .00 F(1, 8475) = 15.32, p = .00 
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Assessment Measures  
The assessment measures used to measure anxiety, worry, and intolerance of 
uncertainty were STAI-Trait, PSWQ, and IUS, respectively. Table 8 presents the 
correlations between anxiety, worry, and intolerance of uncertainty as measured by STAI, 
PSWQ and IUS. All assessment measures were significantly and positively correlated 
with each other. STAI-State and STAI-Trait showed satisfactory internal consistency; 
PSWQ and IUS showed excellent internal consistency.  Means, standard deviations, and 
reliability coefficients of the study measures are also included in Table 8. 
Table 8. Assessment Measures’ Correlations, Means, SD’s, and Reliability 
Coefficients 
 STAI-State STAI-Trait PSWQ IUS 
STAI-State 1.00    
STAI-Trait .831
* 













Mean 38.47 38.68 44.35 53.24 
SD 10.27 10.12 14.85 15.12 
Cronbach’s α .756 .707 .904 .917 
*Statistically significant correlation (p = .01) 
 Table 8 presents the correlations between anxiety, worry, and intolerance of 
uncertainty as measured by STAI, PSWQ and IUS, and reaction time. All assessment 
measures were significantly and negatively correlated with reaction time (Table 9). 
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Table 9. Correlations between Assessment Measures and RT  
 STAI-Trait PSWQ IUS 
RT -.051** -.072** -.108** 
**. Correlation significant at the .01 level. 
 
Anxiety and Repetition Priming 
A linear mixed model analysis was conducted to examine the relationship 
between  anxiety, as measured by STAI-Trait, and RT while controlling for the repetition 
of exposure and the emotion of the faces in the photographs. There was a significant 
relationship between repetition of exposure and reaction time [F(1, 8477 = 18.299, p = 
.000], such that, on average, reaction times during the second exposure were smaller than 
the reaction times during the first exposure. There was a significant relationship between 
of STAI-Trait scores and RT [t(8482) = 21.836, p = .000; r
2
 = .003; β = -.051].  
Further investigation of the relationship between STAI-Trait scores and RT 
indicated that people one standard deviation above the mean (STAI ≥ 49) reacted faster 
during both exposures compared to people one standard deviation below the mean of 
anxiety scores (STAI ≤ 29; Table 10). 



































556.41 295.87 3.21 543.27 295.59 3.21 
Low 
Anxiety 
571.27 286.75 3.11 557.75 286.47 3.11 
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Intolerance, Worry, and Repetition Priming 
A linear mixed model analysis was conducted to examine the relationship 
between worry, as measured by PSWQ, and RT on the first and second exposure to faces 
with happy versus fearful expressions. There was a significant relationship between of 
PSWQ scores and RT [t(8482) = 44.393, p = .000; r
2
 = .005; β = -.072]. Further 
investigation of the relationship indicated that people with scores one standard deviation 
above the mean (PSWQ ≥ 59) reacted faster during both exposures compared to people 
with scores one standard deviation below the mean of worry scores (PSWQ ≤ 29; Table 
11).  


































552.69 291.08 3.16 541.26 290.15 3.15 
Low 
Anxiety 
575.99 297.52 3.23 560.70 297.52 3.23 
 
A linear mixed model analysis was conducted to examine the relationship 
between intolerance of uncertainty, as measured by IUS, and RT on the first and second 
exposure to faces with happy versus fearful expressions. There was a significant 
relationship between IUS scores and RT [t(8482) = 101.176, p = .000; r
2
 = .012; β = -
.108]. Further investigation of the relationship indicated that people with scores one 
standard deviation above the mean (IUS ≥ 68) reacted faster during both exposures 
compared to people with scores one standard deviation below the mean in intolerance of 
uncertainty (IUS ≤ 38; Table 12). 
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542.46 255.11 2.77 529.12 255.11 2.77 
Low 
Anxiety 
572.25 256.95 2.79 558.90 256.95 2.79 
 
Exploratory Analyses   
The first exploratory aim of this study was to investigate the differences in the 
reaction time to happy and fearful stimuli during the first versus second exposure in 
individuals with and without anxiety disorders. A linear mixed model analysis was 
conducted to examine the relationship between anxiety, as diagnosed by the SCID, and 
the response time (RT) to faces displaying a fearful versus happy expression while 
controlling for the repetition of exposure and emotion of the face in the photograph. 
There was a significant relationship between a history of a diagnosis of an anxiety 
disorder and RT, such that people with a lifetime anxiety disorder (A) reacted to both 
fearful and happy stimuli faster than people without an anxiety disorder (NA) [F (1, 
8481) = 81.9, p = .000; M(A) = 530.414, SD(A) = 3.365; M(NA) = 560.868, SD(NA) = 
2.503).  
Another exploratory aim of this study was to investigate the unique contributions 
of trait anxiety, worry, and intolerance of uncertainty to information processing biases as 
evidenced by reaction time. A mixed model analysis was conducted in order to 
investigate the unique contribution of each scale above and beyond their common 
variance. This analysis revealed the model that gave rise to the data, which included three 
 35 
covariates, (order, education, gender), and a main effect of repetition and IUS; the PSWQ 
and the STAI did not appear to have a main effect (Table 13).  
Table 13. Incremental Contribution of STAI, IUS, and PSWQ on RT 
 F(1, 8477) p 
STAI-Trait 2.99 .083 
IUS 51.74 .000 
PSWQ 2.51 .113 
 
The unique contribution of IUS negatively predicted reaction times, such that 
people higher in intolerance of uncertainty responded faster to the stimuli (Table 14). 
Table 14. Direction of Prediction of STAI and IUS in RT 
 t (8481) p β 
IUS -9.64 .000 -1.03 
 
An exploratory analysis was proposed aiming to investigate whether worry is 
higher in the participants with GAD compared to participants with other anxiety 
disorders; however, the sample size of participants with GAD was inadequate (n = 2) and 
did not allow for such analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion  
 Anxiety is a future-oriented emotional state, characterized by avoidance of feared 
stimuli, a sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability, and worry (Antony, Federici, & 
Stein, 2009; Antony, et al., 2001). Cognitive theories of anxiety relate worry and 
intolerance of uncertainty to continuously activated threat schemata and increased 
vigilance for threatening stimuli (Mathews, & Funke, 2006). As such, worry and 
intolerance of uncertainty can be conceptualized as phenomena that are crucial to the 
etiology and maintenance of anxiety. Previous research indicates that the presence of 
anxiety is associated with information processing biases (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Clark 
& McManus, 2002; Heinrichs & Hofman, 2001; Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; 
Musa & Lepine, 2000; McNally, 1999; Summerfeldt & Endler, 1998), such that people 
who experience high levels of anxiety process potentially threatening information 
differently. Previous experimental studies have provided support for the existence of 
information processing biases related to threatening stimuli during verbal-linguistic 
processing, attentional capture, engaged attention, and attentional disengagement (Bar-
Heim et al, 2006). The aim of the current study was to investigate this phenomenon in the 
time following attentional capture and preceding verbal-linguistic processing.  
The primary hypothesis of this study was that people higher in anxiety differ from 
those lower in anxiety in how they process threatening stimuli, such that they take longer 
to process them. This hypothesis was based on the theory that highly anxious people 
preferentially process threatening stimuli, spend more time in processing them, and 
experience difficulties with habituating to them (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; Mogg et al, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
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1997). Current findings lend support to the existence of information processing biases in 
people higher in anxiety, as well as in people with a history of a diagnosis of an anxiety 
disorder. However, the main effect of anxiety – as indicated by both high STAI scores 
and a history of a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder – on reaction times, does not support 
the hypothesis that the repetition priming effect is smaller in those people. In fact, those 
higher in anxiety reacted faster during both first and second exposures to both happy and 
fearful stimuli. These findings would be better explained by theoretical models that 
describe anxiety as the result of failure to habituate to threatening stimuli due to 
avoidance of such stimuli (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Amir, Foa, & 
Coles, 1998; Mogg et al, 1997). Similar findings were made with regard to the main 
effect of worry, as measured by PSWQ, and intolerance of uncertainty, as measured by 
IUS.  
   The secondary hypotheses of the current study suggested that the nature of the 
relationship between information processing biases and anxiety extends to worry and 
intolerance of uncertainty. Current findings lend support to these hypotheses.   
As with the anxiety-reaction time relationship, high worry and high intolerance of 
uncertainty were associated with faster reaction times during both exposures (first and 
second exposure) and to faces with both expressions (happy and fearful). Anxiety is often 
accompanied by worry (Mathews & Funke, 2006). The theoretical model of worry and 
previous research indicate that, among others, intolerance of uncertainty and cognitive 
avoidance are the building blocks of worry (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 
1998). The faster reaction times associated with heightened worry seem to support the 
hypothesized association with an avoidant cognitive style (Buhr & Dugas, 2006).  
 38 
As described above, intolerance of uncertainty has been conceptualized as a 
cognitive process or cognitive filter, and it can be conceptualized as one of the building 
blocks of worry and an anxiety filter (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Dugas et al., 2005; 
Fisher & Wells, 2009).  Previous research has investigated the relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty  and other anxiety-related theoretical constructs, such as worry 
and anxiety sensitivity (Koerner and Dugas, 2008; Norton, 2005). The tasks used in the 
investigation of processing biases and intolerance of uncertainty typically rely on verbal 
processing of information (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Dugas et al., 2005). The current 
study provides evidence that Intolerance of Uncertainty can be investigated in relation to 
implicit information processing biases. Intolerance of uncertainty was shown to have an 
effect on information processing, such that people with higher intolerance of uncertainty 
scores reacted faster to visual stimuli during both exposures.    
A particularly interesting finding emerged in the investigation of the incremental 
contribution of STAI, PSWQ, and IUS in predicting reaction time. The unique 
contribution of IUS negatively predicted reaction times, such that higher IUS scores were 
associated with faster reaction times. This finding was consistent with the previously 
described findings regarding the relationships among anxiety, worry, and intolerance of 
uncertainty. The main effects for all three assessment measures, as well as the unique 
contribution of the IUS, indicate that higher scores are associated with faster reaction 
times, which supports a cognitive theoretical model based on avoidance (Amir, Foa, & 
Coles, 1998; Mogg et al., 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).  
An exploratory aim of this study was to investigate the differences in information 
processing between people with and without a history of a diagnosis of an anxiety 
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disorder. A history of an anxiety disorder may indicate certain cognitive vulnerabilities 
that may be present, even in the absence of a current anxiety disorder. The current study 
provides support for the existence of such cognitive vulnerabilities that become apparent 
in the information processing biases of these individuals. People with a history of an 
anxiety disorder reacted to visual stimuli faster that those without a history of a diagnosis 
of an anxiety disorder.  
Limitations 
Several limitations of this study need to be considered as a basis for future 
research. These limitations are with regard to fit of current findings with a theoretical 
framework, participant engagement during the task, and the lack of a variety of outcome 
measures. 
Researchers have yet to establish findings as they pertain to the repetition priming 
effect in anxious populations. It has been proposed that the repetition priming effect is 
related to the ability to habituate, thus small repetition priming effects in anxious 
individuals were thought to indicate difficulties with habituation to previously 
encountered stimuli (Schwartz et al., 2009). The interpretation of current results is 
limited, given that they do not lend support to the postulated theoretical framework.  
Another weakness of this study regards the number of participants. In the absence 
of previous studies investigating differences in the repetition priming effect due to 
individual differences, it was assumed that these differences produce medium effects. 
The effect of anxiety on the differences in repetition priming effect produces small 
effects and an investigation of these differences required a greater number of participants 
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The extent of attention and interest is also an issue with all experiments that rely 
on participant involvement. An accurate representation of one’s performance requires a 
sufficient number of trials without being affected by eventual fatigue, boredom, or 
aggravation. The repetition priming task was not long; however, it may have proven 
monotonous for some subjects.  
The main aim of the experiment was to examine whether anxiety had an effect on 
repetition priming as measured by reaction time. Reaction time is but one outcome 
measure, and the implications of such an experiment could be increased by the inclusion 
of physiological measures, such as electrodermal activity.     
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 The findings of the current study indicate that anxiety, worry, and intolerance of 
uncertainty affect the perception of visual stimuli. These information processing biases 
are complex and multifarious. Significantly faster reaction times to visual stimuli were 
observed in relation to higher anxiety scores as measured by STAI and in people with a 
history of a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder based on the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-
IV. Similar relationships were found when investigating the relationship between reaction 
times and tendency to worry and intolerance of uncertainty. These faster reaction times to 
potentially threatening visual stimuli seem to be consistent with cognitive theories that 
explain anxiety through the lack of habituation due to excessive avoidance (Antony, 
Federici, & Stein, 2009; Antony, et al., 2001). Concurrently, certain features of anxiety as 
uniquely captured by STAI, were associated with slower reaction times in people with 
higher anxiety scores. These findings seem to be consistent with cognitive theories that 
explain anxiety through excessive allocation of cognitive resources to the investigation of 
 41 
potentially threatening stimuli and difficulties and difficulties (Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Ohman, 1999). These results seem to suggest that the 
mechanisms responsible for information processing biases associated with anxiety are the 
result of multiple, parallel, and intricate processes that need further investigation. 
Evidence from the current study suggests a distinct relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty and information processing biases. Presently, research 
investigating the effect of intolerance of uncertainty on information processing biases or 
behavioral activity typically associated with high anxiety is lacking. This study provides 
initial evidence that intolerance of uncertainty has an effect on these processes. Future 
research would benefit from using other well-established cognitive tasks in order to 
further explore the effect of intolerance of uncertainty on information processing. Future 
research would also benefit from using physiological measurements in order to explore 
the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and bio-physiological characteristics 
that are typically associated with anxiety. The current study highlights the need for the 
investigation of intolerance of uncertainty as a mediator and moderator of anxiety. 
One of the limitations of the current study related to the limited number of 
outcome measures. Future research investigating the effect of anxiety on the repetition 
priming effect would benefit from including additional outcome measures, such as 
physiological reactions to the stimuli.  
Another limitation of this study related to the use of one cognitive task in order to 
investigate information processing biases and their relationship to trait anxiety. Future 
research would benefit from using several well-established cognitive tasks alongside 
repetition priming tasks.  
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Repetition priming is a well established effect; however, differences in the 
repetition priming effect are small. Future studies would benefit from including a larger 
number of participants in order to detect the differences and their relationship with 
measures of anxiety.  
One of the findings of this study related to the effect of intolerance of uncertainty, 
as measured by IUS, on the repetition priming effect. This study may be relevant when 
examining etiological and maintenance factors of anxiety. Specifically, it appears that 
anxiety has an effect on information processing following attention capture and preceding 
verbal processing of threatening stimuli. Current theories of etiology and maintenance of 
anxiety would benefit from further investigation of intolerance of uncertainty as it relates 
to information processing biases and other physiological correlates of anxiety.  
To summarize, this study provided support for the finding that higher trait anxiety 
is associated with information processing biases, such that highly anxious people react to 
stimuli differently. This relationship was also true for tendency to worry, intolerance to 
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Appendix A: Literature Review 
Anxiety is the main and ever-present symptom in anxiety disorders, as classified 
and described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), which affect about 19 million adults in the United States 
every year (Grisel, Rasmussen, & Sperry, 2006). Feelings of anxiety may often be 
accompanied by unrelenting feelings of worry, apprehension, nervousness, fear, panic, 
obsessive thoughts, unwanted intrusive memories, nightmares, or repetitive ritualized 
behaviors. These feelings, thoughts, and behaviors are often characterized by 
dysregulation in muscle-tension or in sleep, respiratory, cardiovascular, or 
gastrointestinal systems.  
Anxiety and fear are both important common elements found in all anxiety 
disorders. Anxiety has been described as an emotional state that is future-oriented, while 
and fear has been described as an alarm reaction that is focused and inflexible (Antony, 
Orsillo, & Roemer, 2001). Intense anxiety and fear are often accompanied by negative 
affect, a sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability, avoidance of feared 
situations/experiences, reliance on safety behaviors in order to reduce perceived threat, 
difficulty concentrating, and worry (Antony, Federici, & Stein, 2009; Antony, et al., 
2001). 
 Worry 
Worry was first defined as a negatively affect-laden and uncontrollable chain of 
thoughts and images that represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on 
an issue of uncertain outcome containing the possibility of at least one negative outcome 
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). Some further define worry as an 
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anticipatory cognitive process characterized by the tendency to interpret ambiguous 
stimuli as threatening, the tendency to predict negative outcomes for uncertain events, 
and the tendency to overestimate risk (Ladouseur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). Still others 
have defined worry as fear-producing thoughts and images related to everyday-life 
experiences and the potential for these experiences to result in adverse ramifications 
(Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Taylor, Thordarson, Sochting, 2002). These thoughts and 
images are thought to be uncontrollable, excessive, repetitive, and to remain unresolved 
(Mathews, & Funke, 2006).  
According to cognitive theories of anxiety, worry is related to the threat schemas 
in an individual’s long-term memory (Mathews, & Funke, 2006). When threat schemas 
are activated, they may increase vigilance for threats that could be internal (e.g. negative 
evaluation) or external (e.g. harm). Increased vigilance for threat and increased detection 
of potentially threatening stimuli is the antecedent of worry. The preferential processing 
of threat detection or biased information processing can have causal effects on the 
etiology and maintenance of anxiety and worry (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009).) 
Research has shown that high worriers need a longer time and a greater amount of 
evidence to make decisions related to ambiguous stimuli (Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 
1991). The relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and worry remains strong 
even after taking into account anxiety and depression (Buhr, & Dugas, 2006). Worry is 
often investigated by comparing people with General Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and 
pathological worry to low-worry non-anxious controls (Holaway, Rodebaugh, & 
Heimberg, 2006); however, a study by Ruscio (2002) indicated that only a modest 
percentage of high worriers (20%) met diagnostic criteria for GAD. Hence, worry is a 
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construct that defines the experience of anxiety and is not necessarily restricted to a 
specific GAD diagnoses. In this study, rather than a specific symptom of GAD, worry is 
conceptualized as a dimensional characteristic that is present in people with any anxiety 
disorders (Naliboff & Rhudy, 2009; Wells & Mathews, 2006; Starcevic & Berle, 2006; 
Gladstone, Parker, Mitchell, Malhi, Wilhelm, & Austin, 2005). The variables that have 
been identified as predictors of excessive worry are: intolerance of uncertainty, beliefs 
that worry has a protective function, negative orientation towards problem situations, and 
cognitive avoidance (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Intolerance of uncertainty is hypothesized to affect clinical and non-clinical worry 
and anxiety via cognitive biases (Dugas et al, 2005). Intolerance of uncertainty has been 
defined as biased perception, as interpretation, and as negative emotional, cognitive and 
behavioral response to uncertain situations and events (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Dugas, 
Hedayati, Karavidas, Buhr, Francis, & Philips, 2005; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). 
People with high intolerance of uncertainty perceive uncertain events as stressful and 
upsetting; they interpret uncertain events as negative, threatening, and unfair; they avoid 
or are unable to act in uncertain situations; and they are unable to tolerate the possibility 
that an event may have negative outcome, even if the probability of such outcome is very 
small (Mathews, & Funke, 2006; Dugas et al., 2005). Intolerance of uncertainty has been 
conceptualized as a dispositional characteristic, a personality trait, a cognitive process, 
and a cognitive filter (Dugas and Robichaud, 2007; Dugas, Hedayati, et al. 2005; Fisher 
& Wells, 2009). Dugas, Hedayati et al. (2005) suggested that intolerance of uncertainty 
results in selective information encoding and interpretation: people with high intolerance 
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of uncertainty pay more attention to uncertain stimuli, go through greater elaborative 
encoding of uncertain information, have enhanced recollection of uncertain stimuli, and 
have greater tendency to interpret such stimuli as threatening. Researchers suggest that 
this preferential encoding of threatening information, threatening interpretation of 
uncertain stimuli, and preferential retrieval from memory of threatening information 
results in extreme concern and worry when any physical or psychological peril is present 
(Koerner, 2008).  Intolerance of uncertainty is a unique contributor that defines the 
experience of anxiety, beyond anxiety symptoms. Intolerance of Uncertainty has been 
conceptualized both as a cognitive vulnerability and as a characteristic of anxiety; it is 
part of a vicious circle where its presence influences worry which in turn interferes with 
information processing of uncertain stimuli (Koerner and Dugas, 2008).  
Information Processing Bias 
One of the factors deemed critical in the development and maintenance of 
intolerance of uncertainty, worry, and ultimately anxiety disorders is biased information-
processing (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). Biased information processing is at the 
center of many theoretical models of anxiety disorders (Rapee, 2001; Mogg, & Bradley, 
1998; Mathews, & Mackintosh, 1998; Eysenck, 1992; Beck, & Clark, 1997; Clark, & 
Wells, 1995; Woody, & Rachman, 1994; Ohman, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988; Foa, & Kozak, 1986). Biased information processing in people with 
anxiety, rather than narrow, deficient, incorrect, or distorted, means selective information 
processing that is negatively biased, resulting in higher-than-normal vigilance for 
threatening and other adverse stimuli.. It is worth noting that information processing 
biases occur in all people and these biases are driven by a person’s experiences and 
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cognitions regarding the world and the self ; however, in anxious people these biases 
tends to reconfirm their view of the world as a dangerous place (Ouimet, Gawrinski, & 
Dozois, 2009). Information processing bias has been investigated during different stages 
of information processing—specifically during transformation of stimuli into subjective 
cognitive representations of these stimuli (encoding) (Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2002; 
MacLeod, 1991), during the process of assigning meaning and placing stimuli in a 
constellation of similar and related cognitive structures (interpretation) (Wilson, 
MacLeod, & Campbell, 2007; Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2002), and during the process by 
which subjective representations of stimuli that had been stored in memory are recalled 
or recognized (retrieval) (Mitte, 2008; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn, 2007). While most researchers agree, in part, that anxiety is 
characterized by information processing biases (McNally & Reese, 2009), they disagree 
on the pattern and timeline in which such biases occur. 
Theoretical Models of Information Processing Biases and Anxiety 
Early cognitive theories of the etiology of anxiety proposed that anxiety is the 
result of enhanced automatic encoding and retrieval of threatening stimuli, and 
threatening interpretation of uncertain stimuli. Two such theories are the ones developed 
by Beck (1976) and by Bower (1983). Beck (1976) theorized that automatic maladaptive 
schemata facilitate the encoding and retrieval of threatening information, and threatening 
interpretation of uncertain information, which in turn results in anxiety disorders. Bower 
(1983) theorized that anxiety is enhanced and maintained through automatic proliferation 
of anxiety nodes throughout the semantic network. Despite the differences in the timeline 
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of the automatic cognitive processes that enhance and maintain anxiety, both theories 
predict facilitated processing of threatening stimuli. 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews (1988) suggested that the attention of 
anxious individuals is immediately captured by threatening stimuli and that attentional 
resources are disproportionately allocated to processing these stimuli during the initial, 
automatic stages of processing. Ohman (1999) also suggested that information biases in 
anxious individuals take place during the initial pre-attentive processing of threatening 
stimuli. Others proposed that the attention of individuals with anxiety is not 
disproportionately engaged by threatening stimuli in the initial stages of perception, but 
resources are disproportionately allocated towards threatening stimuli during later, 
elaborative and interpretative processes (Mathews, & Mackintosh, 1998; Foa & Kozak, 
1986; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997).  
Recent theoretical models of information processing in anxiety disorders have 
offered reconciliatory explanations of these biases. These theories include biased or 
selective processing in both initial and later, both automatic and conscious stages of 
information processing. They include preferential processing of threatening stimuli 
during initial, automatic stages and threatening interpretation and elaboration of uncertain 
stimuli during later, conscious stages of information processing. Beck and Clark (1997) 
proposed a model that includes initial automatic preferential processing of threatening 
stimuli, followed by sustained selective semantic elaboration of these stimuli. Eysenck 
(1992) proposed a model that includes initial automatic preferential processing of 
threatening stimuli, followed by threatening interpretation of uncertain stimuli. Other 
models include preferential initial, automatic processing of threatening stimuli, and 
 50 
avoidance of these stimuli during later stages (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Mogg et al, 1997); this attention-avoidance pattern 
prevents individuals with anxiety from assessing the threat accurately and from 
habituating to the level of threat.  
Experimental Studies of Information Processing Bias in Anxiety, Worry, and Intolerance 
of Uncertainty 
Information processing biases in anxiety disorders have generated a great deal of 
interest followed by research investigating such biases in people with a specific anxiety 
disorder. Reviews of this research have provided support for the existence of processing 
biases in people with posttraumatic stress disorder, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and phobias.  
Clark and McManus (2002) reviewed experimental studies that investigated 
information processing biases in people with social phobia. They found that people with 
social phobia tend to interpret ambiguous social events as threatening and negative social 
events as catastrophic. People with social phobia also have a bias towards detecting 
negative social responses, a bias toward recalling negative information about self when 
expecting difficult social interactions, and reduced allocation of cognitive resources to 
processing social cues. Heinrichs and Hofmann (2001) reviewed studies that used the 
emotional Stroop and the dot-probe paradigm to investigate attention, judgment, and 
memory biases in people with social phobia. They concluded that people with social 
phobia display attentional and judgmental biases towards socially threatening 
information, but added that there is not sufficient evidence for memory biases. 
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Mogg and Bradley (2005) reviewed experimental studies that used the emotional 
Stroop and visual probe tasks to investigate attentional biases in people with Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD). The researchers concluded that people with GAD, differently 
from normal controls and people with depression, have automatic attentional bias for 
external negative cues. The researchers added that evaluation of threatening stimuli, 
compared to attentional biases, has a stronger effect on the maintenance of anxiety. 
Buckley, Blanchard and Neill (2000) reviewed experimental studies investigating 
intelligence, memory, and attentional biases in people with posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). The authors concluded that evidence for preconscious recognition processing 
bias was mixed. The researchers found evidence indicating preferential automatic 
encoding of trauma-related information and biased processing and interpretation of 
trauma-related information. 
Summerfeldt and Endler (1998) reviewed experimental studies investigating 
cognitive biases in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The paradigms used in the 
studies were auditory threshold tasks, modified Stroop, and dot-probe detection. The 
authors concluded that evidence for information processing biases in people with OCD is 
inconclusive. The authors added that the mixed results may be attributed to the difficulty 
of identifying stimuli that are similarly threatening for the majority of people with OCD.  
A systematic quantitative review of research investigating information processing 
biases in all anxiety disorders provided evidence that threat-related bias is a robust 
phenomenon, which differentiates non-anxious individuals from those with different 
types of anxiety across a variety of experimental conditions (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
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Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn, 2007). This evidence was consistent across 
anxiety disorders, ages of participants, and experimental paradigms.  
Research on information processing biases and worry or intolerance of 
uncertainty has provided support for biased recall for stimuli denoting uncertainty (Dugas 
et al., 2005), threatening interpretation of ambiguous statements (Dugas et al., 2005), 
indecisiveness and hypersensitivity to threat (Rassin & Muris, 2005), and concern and 
threatening appraisal of ambiguous situations (Keorner & Dugas, 2008). Studies 
investigating processing biases in worry and intolerance of uncertainty have used verbal-
linguistic stimuli and have assessed biases during the interpretative and elaborative phase 
of information processing. 
Dugas at al. (2005) presented their participants with neutral words and words 
denoting uncertainty, after which they asked the participants to recall as many of the 
presented words as possible. The researchers found that participants with high intolerance 
of uncertainty recalled more uncertain words than they did neutral words, and 
participants with high intolerance of uncertainty recalled a greater proportion of uncertain 
words than participants with low intolerance of uncertainty. The researchers concluded 
that intolerance of uncertainty leads to biased recall for stimuli denoting uncertainty.  
In a second study, the researchers sought to further explore the relationship 
between intolerance of uncertainty and information processing biases by examining the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and interpretation of uncertain situations. 
Dugas et al. (2005) asked their participants to complete several questionnaires, one of 
them being the Ambiguous/Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey, Hampton, 
Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). The AUSD includes fictitious diary entries, half of which are 
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worded ambiguously. The participants are asked to rate their degree of concern for each 
item on a 5-point scale. The researchers found that people with high intolerance of 
uncertainty expressed more concern for the ambiguous items than did those with low 
intolerance of uncertainty. They also found that the tendency to make threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous statements was highly correlated to intolerance of 
uncertainty, more so than to anxiety, worry, or depression.  
Rassin and Muris (2005) also used the AUSD to investigate the relationship 
between indecisiveness and hypersensitivity to threat. In addition to measures of 
indecisiveness, they included measures of worry and intolerance of uncertainty. The 
researchers found that threat perception was significantly associated with proneness to 
worry but it was not associated with intolerance of uncertainty.  
Koerner and Dugas (2008) investigated the appraisals of ambiguous, negative, 
and positive vignettes from the AUSD (Davey et al., 1992) in people with high and low 
intolerance of uncertainty. They found that people with high IU, compared to those with 
low IU, appraised all types of ambiguous situations presented in the vignettes as more 
disconcerting. Further, high IU remained a robust predictor of disconcerting appraisals 
after anxiety symptoms, sex, and mood variables were statistically controlled. They also 
investigated the role of worry in disconcerting appraisals. They found that worry was a 
significant partial mediator of the relationship of IU to disconcerting appraisals of 
ambiguous situations. The authors explained that worry is a symptom of biased cognitive 
processes as well as an active actor in the perpetuation of these processes that give rise to 
worry in the first place. The authors hypothesized that worry is the activity that consumes 
cognitive resources that result in biased cognitive processes.  
 54 
Dugas et al. (2005) reasoned that words are the ideal medium of investigating 
biases in information processing in worriers and people with high intolerance of 
uncertainty, because verbal-linguistic processes predominate in worry. This study will 
investigate the possibility that disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources 
permeates all cognitive processes and the relationship between worry or intolerance of 
uncertainty and biased information processing will be evident even when the ambiguous 
stimuli are non-verbal and the participants are required to make judgments about non-
threatening and non-ambiguous characteristics of the stimuli.  
Paradigms Used in the Study of Information Processing Biases 
Two important characteristics of paradigms used to investigate information 
processing are the effect that presence of anxiety has on task completion, and the 
operationalization of bias. The presence of anxiety can either facilitate or disrupt 
performance on a task. One type of paradigms used to investigate information processing 
biases entails tasks performed in the presence and/or absence of emotional stimuli. This 
type of tasks reveals information processing bias through interference/disruption of task 
completion in the presence of threatening stimuli. Another type of paradigm used to 
investigate information processing entails tasks involving threatening stimuli. The 
threatening stimuli are used in such a way that presence of anxiety increases ease of task 
completion. The combined results of these types of experiments provide strong support 
for the presence of information processing biases in anxiety disorders.  
The paradigms that have been used to investigate processing biases towards 
threatening stimuli are the emotional Stroop, dot-probe, emotional spatial cuing, and 
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visual search. These paradigms investigate different aspects of processing biases during 
the early stages of attentional processes.  
Emotional Stroop 
The emotional Stroop, like the classic Stroop, includes words written in colored 
font and the participants are required to state the name of the color rather than read the 
word. During the emotional Stroop, the participants are instructed to announce the font 
color of neutral and emotional words. Processing bias becomes evident when participants 
have longer reaction times when they announce the font color of threatening words 
compared to neutral words. The use of emotional Stroop paradigm has resulted in strong 
support for the existence of processing biases with threatening stimuli; however, this bias 
is evidenced during verbal-linguistic processing of the stimuli (Bar-Heim et al., 2007).  
Dot-probe Task 
During the dot-probe task, the participants are presented with two stimuli – one 
threatening and one neutral – that are replaced by a single probe in the location of either 
the threatening or the neutral stimulus. Processing bias becomes evident when 
participants have shorter reaction times when they react to probes replacing threatening 
stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. The use of dot-probe paradigm has resulted in strong 
support for the existence of biases in allocation of attention when presented with 
threatening stimuli; however, it remains unclear whether it provides support for enhanced 
attention engagement with threatening stimuli or impaired ability to disengage from such 
stimuli (Bar-Heim et al., 2007).  
Spatial Cuing 
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During the emotional spatial cuing paradigm, the participants are presented with a 
neutral or a threat related cue in one of two locations and the cue is followed by a 
stimulus. The stimulus is presented at the same location as the cue the majority of the 
time and at the alternative location the rest of the time. Processing bias becomes evident 
when the difference in reaction time for same-location vs. alternative-location trials is 
greater for threat-related cues than it is for neutral cues. While providing support for 
processing biases for threatening information, the emotional cuing paradigm does not 
elucidate whether this bias is due to disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources or 
to impaired ability to disengage attention from threatening stimuli.  
Emotional Visual Search 
During the emotional visual search paradigm, the participants are presented with a 
group of photographs of faces displaying the same emotion or with a group of 
photographs of faces, with one of the faces displaying an emotion different from the rest. 
The participants are instructed to indicate whether the emotion displayed by the faces in 
the photographs is homogenous or heterogeneous. Processing bias becomes evident when 
there are shorter reaction times to heterogeneous groups of photographs where the 
divergent face is displaying a threatening emotion. Enhanced performance in detecting 
threatening stimuli indicates enhanced attentional capture of threatening stimuli; 
however, it remains unclear whether there is a disproportionate allocation of cognitive 
resources to the processing of threatening stimuli (Horstmann, Borgstedt, & Heuman, 
2006). 
In summation, the paradigms described above allow for making conclusions with 
regards to information processing biases in general, and specifically with regards to 
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disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources in verbal-linguistic processing of 
threatening stimuli (emotional Stroop), engaged attention or inability to disengage 
attention with threatening stimuli (dot-probe task), engaged attention with threatening 
stimuli (spatial cuing), and enhanced attentional capture of threatening stimuli (emotional 
visual search). The repetition priming task that will be used in this study will allow for 
investigation of the disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources during the non-
verbal processing of threatening stimuli.  
The bias toward prioritizing threat encoding is present at the earliest stages of 
attentional processes, as the individuals rapidly orient to and detect the crucial 
characteristics of a stimulus (Surcinelli et al, 2006; Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 
1998).  The repetition priming task that will be used in this study aims to investigate 
disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources following the attention capture and 
preceding the verbal processing of threatening stimuli or disengagement from stimuli.  
Repetition Priming 
Repetition priming is the increased ease of processing a stimulus following a 
single previous presentation (Schacter, 1987). The repetition priming effect can be 
assessed by comparing the participants’ initial reaction to a stimulus with the reaction to 
the following presentation of the same stimulus. The differences between initial and 
following presentations are observable in behavioral and biological reactions. Some 
behavioral indicators of priming are reduced reaction time (Thomas & LaBar, 2005), 
increased accuracy of identification (Sciama, & Dowker, 2007), and increased probability 
of producing the primed stimulus (Zhou, Hu, Sun, & Huang, 2006). Biological indicators 
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of priming include reduced brain activation evident in fMRI (Orfanidou, Marslen-Wilson, 
& Davis, 2006) and EEG data (Wiese, Schweinberger, & Neuman, 2008).   
Repetition priming tasks are characterized by consecutive presentations of stimuli. 
The first presentation of the stimulus is often indicated as the first or prime phase. In the 
second presentation or the test phase, the previously presented stimuli are intermixed 
with new ones. The participants are usually asked to react to or to make cognitive or 
perceptual judgments that do not require recollection of previous encounters with the 
stimuli (Thomas & LaBar, 2005). Cognitive or perceptual judgments made during the test 
phase of the tasks are often made faster or more accurately than during the prime phase.  
Repetition priming was initially explored through the use of cognitive tasks 
involving lexical decisions (Forbach, Stanners, & Hochhaus, 1974), word identification 
(Neisser, 1954), or word stem/fragment completion (Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982). It 
further evolved to include drawings (Cave, Bost & Cobb, 1992) and photographs of 
objects and faces (Bruce, Burton, Carson, & Mason, 1994; Mitchell & Brown, 1988; 
Warren & Morton, 1982; Uttl, Graf, & Santacruz, 2006).   
In a study by Bruce and Valentine (1985), the participants were shown pictures of 
famous people, and in the test phase were asked to report as quickly as possible if the 
face in the picture was familiar. The materials in the test phase included previously 
viewed pictures of famous people, novel pictures of the same celebrities, intermixed with 
completely new material. The researchers found significant effects of repetition priming. 
The priming effect was strongest in the presentation of previously viewed pictures, and 
smaller, yet still present, in the presentation of new pictures of the same celebrities.  
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Goshen-Gottstein and Ganel (2000) asked their participants to rate the apparent 
intelligence of presented faces. In the test phase, they asked their participants to decide as 
quickly and accurately as possible the gender of previously presented and novel faces, 
devoid of paraphernalia that could help in this judgment. The participants were 
significantly more accurate and faster in making sex judgments about the previously 
presented pictures, compared to the novel ones.  
Stevenage and Spreadbury (2006) investigated the effect of a face’s familiarity on 
repetition priming. The participants in the study viewed pictures of celebrities rated on 
account of their familiarity (high, intermediate and low), and made a gender decision. In 
the prime phase the participants viewed 32 pictures of varied familiarity; in the test phase 
the participants viewed a mixture of primed and unprimed stimuli. Priming effects were 
observed for all groups of previously presented stimuli, with less familiar stimuli 
showing a significantly stronger priming effect than more familiar ones.  
Similar findings have been supported by studies employing event-related potential 
techniques (Begletier, Porjesz, & Wang, 1995; Itier & Taylor, 2002; Schweinberger, 
Pfütze, & Sommer, 1995; Trenner, Schweinberger, Jentzsh, & Sommer, 2004), and brain 
imaging technology (Bentley, Vuilleumier, Thiel, Driver, & Dolan, 2003; Orfanidou, 
Marslen-Wilson, & Davis, 2006; Pourtois, Schwartz, Seghier, Lazeyras, & Vuilleumier, 
2005).  
Repetition priming research has moved on to focus on the factors that influence 
priming, so as to account for the different patterns of the priming effect shown in 
different studies (Bruce, Burton, Carson, & Mason, 1994). Some of the factors that have 
been examined include participant perceptual involvement (Quinn & Macrae, 2005), 
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stimulus characteristic that the participants were asked to focus on (Wiese, 
Schweinberger, & Neuman, 2008), task congruency (Wiese, Schweinberger, & Neuman, 
2008), amount of detail and size of stimulus (Bruce, Burton, Carson, & Mason, 1994), 
perceptual load (Jenkins, Burton, & Ellis, 2002), and similarity of stimuli in the prime 
and test phase (Bruce & Valentine, 1985) 
Wiese, Schweinberger and Neuman (2008) instructed their participants to identify 
the gender or age of unfamiliar faces. In the second phase all the pictures were new and 
the task was switched: the participants that previously identified the gender of presented 
faces, now identified age, and vice versa.Later the task was a repetition of the first phase 
and the stimuli was old intermixed with new.  The researchers found that priming in the 
age detection task was stronger and more accurate than in the gender detection task. 
Repetition priming in the gender identification task was observed when the priming and 
test task matched.  
Quinn and Macrae (2005) asked the participants to passively view pictures of 
unfamiliar faces or identify the gender of the presented face as quickly as possible. In the 
test phase, the participants identified the gender of primed or novel faces. The authors 
found a priming effect only for the faces that were presented in the active encoding 
condition and concluded that the processing of unfamiliar faces does not occur 
automatically and that gender judgments facilitate stronger repetition priming effects. 
Mere presentation of the priming stimulus may not be sufficient to produce a 
behaviorally measured priming effect, and the effect is dependent on processing 
operations involving the stimulus (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 
1997). 
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Jenkins, Burton, and Ellis (2002) presented their participants in the prime phase 
with a display of a letter-string superimposed on the face of a celebrity. The researchers 
manipulated the perceptual load during the presentation of faces, by asking the 
participants to respond to the color of the letter-string (low load) or to the identity of a 
target letter (high load). During the test phase, they asked the participants to report on the 
familiarity of the faces and found that perceptual load had no effect on repetition priming.  
Bruce, Burton, Carson, & Mason (1994), instead of using photographs, used the 
digitized cartoon versions on famous faces. They manipulated the pattern of light and 
dark elements in familiar faces (black and white or black and white with two additional 
levels of gray) and the size of the image.  The researchers found stronger priming effects 
for images with more levels of gray, but no differences in the priming effect of images of 
different size.  
Bruce and Valentine (1985) presented the participants with pictures of famous 
people, and in the test phase asked them to respond as quickly as possible if the faces 
were familiar. The researchers manipulated the view of the primed faces, by presenting 
different pictures of the same faces. They found strong support for repetition priming, but 
concluded that differences between the priming effects of two different views of famous 
faces were insignificant. A similar study conducted by Ellis, Burton, Young and Flude 
(1997) provided support for graded repetition priming effect, with more similar pictures 
producing stronger priming effects. 
Repetition Priming Stimuli: Emotional Faces  
The presentation of a human face is a powerful stimulus that initiates immediate 
cognitive processing (Wiese, Schweinberger, & Neuman, 2008). Within fractions of a 
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second we perceive enough information from a presented face so as to make judgments 
on someone’s gender, race and age (Bruce, & Young, 1998). One of the vital 
characteristics of a face is the emotion of the face (Wiese, Schweinberger, Neuman, 
2008). Emotionality is a characteristic that often results in a lasting and salient memory 
of that stimulus (Parrot & Spackman, 2000). Emotional expressions are one of the factors 
that have been investigated in the framework of repetition priming in the attempt to better 
understand the impact of emotions on perception (Burton, Rabin, Wyatt, Frohlich, Vardy, 
& Dimitri, 2005; Bentley, Vuilleumier, Thiel, Driver, & Dolan, 2003; Campanella, 
Quinet, Bruyer, Crommelinck,  & Guerit, 2002). Previous research indicates that the 
introduction of an emotional dimension leads to changes in the repetition priming effect. 
This study will investigate the repetition priming effect for photographs of faces 
displaying happy or fearful expressions. The advantage of using emotional faces is that it 
requires minimal verbal-linguistic processing.  
Burton et al. (2005) used pictures of two unfamiliar faces displaying neutral and 
negative expressions in different orientations of the head. During the exposure phase, the 
participants viewed 72 pictures and were asked to indicate which of the two faces was 
presented on the computer screen. During the test phase, 32 pictures from the exposure 
phase were intermixed with 32 novel pictures of the same two individuals and the 
participants performed the same task. The researchers found a stronger repetition priming 
effect for the pictures displaying negative expressions, compared to the neutral 
expression. Of all the negative emotions, fear yielded the slowest and least accurate 
responses. 
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Bentley et al. (2003) presented their participants with pictures of unfamiliar faces 
and houses situated at the poles of a cross-format display. The pictures of unfamiliar 
faces had a fearful or neutral expression. The participants were cued to attend to either 
the horizontal (east-west) or vertical (north-south) poles, and the participants were asked 
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible whether the attended to stimuli were the 
same. The researchers concluded that emotional stimuli reduce behavioral priming.  
Campanella et al. (2002) used event-related potential technology to investigate the 
differences in responses to similar versus different faces with a happy or fearful 
expression.   The stimuli were blocked in pairs including pairs of pictures displaying the 
same emotion, different emotions, or the same picture repeated twice. The researchers 
observed priming effects for same pairs evident in electrophysiological data, however the 
researchers recognized that the instructions may have prompted the participants to search 
for possible yet nonexistent differences in the pictures. 
Research to date indicates that the introduction of an emotional dimension leads 
to changes in the repetition priming effect. Depending on the valence of the emotion, the 
repetition priming effect can be enhanced or reduced in non-clinical samples.  The studies 
exploring the repetition priming effect with emotional stimuli have explored the effect of 
fearful faces, and have found support for the existence of the effect.  
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Appendix B: Instruments 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Please indicate your responses to the following questions, by checking the space before 

















_____1. African/African American 
_____2. Asian/Asian American 
_____3. Caucasian/European American 
_____4. Hispanic/Hispanic American 
_____5. Native American 









State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. 
Read each statement and then write the number in the blank at the end of the statement 
that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend 
too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how 
you generally feel. 
 
1 







very much so 
 
1. I feel pleasant ____ 
2. I feel nervous and restless ____ 
3. I feel satisfied with myself ____ 
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be ____ 
5. I feel like a failure ____ 
6. I feel rested ____ 
7. I am “calm, cool, and collected” ____ 
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them ____ 
9. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter ____ 
10. I am happy ____ 
11. I have disturbing thoughts ____ 
12. I lack self-confidence ____ 
13. I feel secure ____ 
14. I make decisions easily ____ 
15. I feel inadequate _____ 
16. I am content ____ 
17. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me ____ 
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind ____ 
19. I am a steady person ____ 
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and 
interests ____ 
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 Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
You will find below a series of statements which describe how people may react to the 
uncertainties of life. Please use the scale below to describe to which extent each item is 
























_____1. Uncertainty stops me from having a firm opinion. 
_____2. Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized. 
_____3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable. 
_____4. It’s not fair that there are no guaranties in life. 
_____5. My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will happen tomorrow. 
_____6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed. 
_____7. Unforeseen events upset me greatly. 
_____8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need. 
_____9. Being uncertain allows me to foresee the consequences beforehand and to 
prepare for them. 
_____10.  One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises. 
_____11. A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best of 
planning. 
_____12. When it’s time to act uncertainly it paralyses me. 
_____13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate. 
_____14. When I am uncertain I can’t go forward. 
_____15. When I am uncertain I can’t function very well. 
_____16. Unlike me, others always seem to know where they are going with their 
lives. 
_____17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad. 
_____18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me. 
_____19. I hate being taken by surprise. 
_____20. The smallest doubt stops me from acting. 
_____21. I should be able to organize everything in advance. 
_____22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence. 
_____23. I think it’s unfair that other people seem sure about their future. 
_____24. Uncertainty stops me from sleeping well. 
_____25. I must get away from uncertain situations. 
_____26. The ambiguities in life stress me. 
_____27. I can’t stand being undecided about my future. 
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristic each item is of you, 
putting the number next to the item. 
 
1 













_____1. If I don’t have enough time to do everything, I don’t worry about it. 
_____2. My worries overwhelm me. 
_____3. I do not tend to worry about things. 
_____4. Many situations make me worry. 
_____5. I know I shouldn’t worry about things, but I just cannot help it. 
_____6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot. 
_____7. I’m always worrying about something. 
_____8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 
_____9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything else I have 
to do. 
_____10. I never worry about anything. 
_____11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I don’t worry about 
it anymore. 
_____12. I’ve been a worrier all my life. 
_____13. I notice that I have been worrying about things. 
_____14. Once I start worrying, I can’t stop. 
_____15. I worry all the time. 





Appendix C: Consent Form 
Page 1 of 3 
                Initials _______ Date ______ 
CONSENT FORM  
Project Title Repetition priming and recognition biases in individuals with and 
without anxiety. 
Why is this 
research 
being done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Dr. Barry Smith 
and Earta Norwood, M.S. at the University of Maryland, College 
Park.  We are inviting you to participate in this research because 
you are at least 18 years of age and you are a student at the 
University of Maryland at College Park. The purpose of this 
research project is to explore how anxiety, a tendency to worry, 
and intolerance of uncertainty may influence cognitive processing 
of faces displaying different emotions. 
What will I be 




The procedures involve one session which lasts approximately 2 
hours 30 minutes. During the first part of the session, we will 
complete a structured clinical interview assessing for major 
psychological disorders and you will complete multiple 
questionnaires asking a variety of questions assessing your 
anxiety, tendency to worry, and intolerance of uncertainty. 
Sample items include: I am always worrying about something; I 
never worry about anything; I hate being taken by surprise; I feel 
calm, etc. You will then be asked to engage in two computer 
tasks that involve making simple decisions about pictures of faces 
presented on the screen. You will indicate your answers by 





All information collected during the course of the study is 
confidential, and your name will not be identified at any time to 
the extent permitted by law.  
We will do our best to keep your personal information 
confidential.  Specifically, to protect your confidentiality, your 
name will not be included on any questionnaires or other 
collected data; instead, all data will be identified by a number 
only. Also, your consent form (the only paper containing your 
name) will be kept in a locked filing cabinet separate from the 
other information you provide. Only the person in charge of this 
study will have access to the filing cabinet with your consent 
form, and only study personnel will have access to your data in 
general, including the blood pressure measurements. All data 
from this study will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a locked 
room for the duration of five years. Following this five year 
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period, all data will be destroyed. The data you provide in this 
research study, without your name attached, will be grouped with 
data from other participants if the results of the study are used in 
scientific reports or presentations.  
 
 Your information may be shared with representatives of the 
University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities 
if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so 
by law. 
 
In accordance with legal requirements and/or professional 
standards, we will disclose to the appropriate individuals and/or 
authorities information that comes to our attention concerning 
child abuse or neglect or potential harm to you or others.     
What are the 
risks of this 
research? 
 
Risks to participants in the proposed study are minimal. You will 
undergo a clinical assessment. Some participants may be 
uncomfortable describing symptoms of psychological disorders 
that they may have.  However, some people derive benefit from 
clinical interviews.   
 
What are the 
benefits of 
this research?  
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the 
results may help the investigator learn more about the effects of 
emotional processes on thought processes. We hope that, in the 
future, other people might benefit from this study through 
improved understanding of effects of certain emotions on specific 
aspects of how we think. 
 
Do I have to 
be in this 
research? 
May I stop 
participating 
at any time?   
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You 
may choose not to take part in this study at all. If you decide to 
participate in this research, you may stop participating at any 
time. If you decide not to participate in this study, or if you stop 
participating at any time, you will not be penalized, nor will you 
lose any benefits for which you otherwise qualify.  
 
Is any medical 
treatment 
available if I 
am injured? 
 
The University of Maryland does not provide any medical, 
hospitalization or other insurance for participants in this research 
study, nor will the University of Maryland provide any medical 
treatment or compensation for any injury sustained as a result of 
participation in this research study, except as required by law. 
 
What if I have 
questions? 
 
This research is being conducted by Dr. Barry Smith and Earta 
Norwood at the University of Maryland, College Park. If you 
have any questions about the research study itself, please contact 
Dr. Smith at bdsmith@psyc.umd.edu or (301) 405-5807 or Earta 
Norwood at enorwood@psyc.umd.edu. 
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If you have questions about your rights as a research participant 
or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, 
College Park, Maryland, 20742; 301-405-0678; 
irb@deans.umd.edu.  
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 









Your signature indicates that: you are at least 18 years of age, the 
research has been explained to you, your questions have been 
fully answered, and you freely and voluntarily choose to 
participate in this research project.  
 
___  I agree to participate in this study 






















Appendix D: Protocol Script  
Protocol Script: Assessment 
Now I will give you a couple of questionnaires that you will fill out. After you 
have completed the questionnaires, I will ask you a few questions from a psychological 
diagnostic interview. The questions will be about your experiences and feelings. They are 
a standard set of questions that I ask to all participants. Do you have any questions? 
Protocol Script: Task 1  
Now you are ready to start with the first computer task. During this task, you will 
see a series of pictures of male or female faces on the screen. If the face is male, quickly 
press the left arrow key. If the face is female, quickly press the right arrow key. You must 
press the correct key as quickly as possible. Once you have made your choice, a new 
male or female face will appear on the screen and you must again quickly choose the left 
arrow key for males and the right arrow key for females as before. This will continue 
until this section of the experiment is complete. Before the task begins you will practice 
with a series of eight pictures. These pictures are not part of the experiment. After the 
practice session, you will start the first task. If you have any questions, please feel free to 
ask them now.   
Protocol Script: Task 2 
 Now you are ready to start with the second computer task. During this task 
you will see two pictures on the screen. Both pictures will be of the same person showing 
different expressions. One picture will always be from task 1, and one picture will always 
be new, but both pictures will be of the same person’s face. When the picture on the left 
is the same as during task 1, press the left arrow key. When the picture on the right is the 
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same as during task 1, press the right arrow key. You must press the correct key as 
quickly as possible. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask them now.   
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Appendix E: Debriefing  
Debriefing Form 
The purpose of this study is to investigate information processing biases in people 
with and without anxiety. Information processing denotes the mental processes by which 
we take in, interpret, and store in our memory any information that we encounter. Biased 
information processing means different and selective processing. Biased information 
processing does not mean narrow or distorted processing. Research indicates that 
information processing in people with anxiety is different from that in people without 
anxiety. Some theories propose that people with anxiety devote more time or energy to 
process potentially threatening information and have better memory for such information. 
Researchers are still trying to identify the specific ways in which these biases change 
perception in individuals with anxiety, and the timeline of their occurrence. 
Consequently, there is a need for research to better identify the factors that influence 
information processing biases and the timeline in which the processing biases unfold. 
This was the goal of the present study. Specifically, we are interested in the time 
difference that it takes to make decisions on stimuli encountered for the first and second 
time, and if these time differences are different in people with and without anxiety. 
Further, we are interested in the accuracy of memories concerning potentially threatening 
stimuli (the photographs of faces displaying fearful emotion) and if there are any 
differences in the accuracy of such memories between people with and without anxiety 
disorders.  
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To this end, you were asked to complete a number of questionnaires assessing 
anxiety factors, as well as to complete two computer tasks. The first task was designed to 
measure the time you needed to process the photographs presented on the computer 
screen and make simple decisions about them. The second task was designed to measure 
the accuracy of your memory for potentially threatening stimuli 
Your participation in this study may help us discover ways in which people with 
anxiety differ in their perception of threatening stimuli from people without anxiety. This 
research may ultimately help in learning much more about the development and 
maintenance of anxiety, as well as the development of treatments aimed at reducing 
anxiety.  If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now, or contact Dr. 
Barry Smith at bdsmith@psyc.umd.edu or Earta Norwood at enorwood@psyc.umd.edu 
or (301) 405-5887.   
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Appendix F: Referral List 
During or as a result of the assessment procedures completed in this study, you 
may realize that you have questions that you would like to discuss further with a mental 
health professional. Below you will find a list of referrals on and off campus in the case 
that you would like learn more information regarding any feelings of frustration, 
discomfort, or depression from a mental health professional. These referrals were 
obtained from an established referral list already in use at the University of Maryland 
Psychology Clinic: 
Judith Sprei, Ph.D.  
4701 Samgamore Rd. Ste. 1355 
Bethesda, MD 20816 
301-229-0065 
Ruth Murray, M.D. 
2340 University Blvd. E. 
Hyattsville, MD 20783 
301-608-9205 
Behavior Therapy Center 
(BTC) of Greater 
Washington 





Dr. William Stixrud & 
Associates 
8720 Georgia Ave., Suite 300 Silver 
Spring, MD 20910  
301-565-0534, Fax:      
301-565-2217 
University of Maryland 
The Center for Health & 
Wellbeing        
University Health Center 
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD 20742 
   301-314-5661 
University of Maryland 
Psychology Clinic 
Biology/Psychology Building, Ste. 
2114, College Park, MD 20742 
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